| By Yenting Lin |

Abstract: This article examines the evolving strategies of China’s influence operations targeting Taiwan, focusing on how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs soft power, digital platforms, and grassroots networks to reshape Taiwanese identity and weaken democratic resilience. Instead of focusing only on political elites, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is now working to shape public opinion through emotional and cultural tools. These efforts include content from social media influencers, student exchange programs, religious events, and cross-strait marriages. Drawing on official CCP and PLA doctrine, Taiwanese government reports, and whistleblower cases. This research identifies five core methods of Chinese influence in Taiwan: influencer propaganda, student exchanges, grassroots political co-optation, cross-strait family influence, and algorithm-driven disinformation. It then evaluates Taiwan’s multi-actor counterstrategy—including civic tech innovation, legal reform, and international coalition-building. The study argues that China takes advantage of Taiwan’s openness, but the real defense lies in building public trust, flexible institutions, and strong community ties. In the end, protecting democracy is not just about national security, it’s also about how people connect, trust, and live together every day.

From Power to Cultural Influence: How China Is Reshaping Its Strategy on Taiwan

China has changed how it tries to influence Taiwan. Instead of focusing only on military threats or political deals with elites, Beijing is now using soft power to shape how ordinary Taiwanese people, especially young people, think and feel about China.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially laid out this new direction in its 2022 white paper, which made clear that “peaceful reunification” can only happen if Taiwan gives up all ideas of independence (State Council Information Office, 2022). At the same time, the CCP updated its United Front Work regulations to expand its efforts beyond politics and into daily life—through education, business, tourism, and online platforms (Global Taiwan Institute, 2023). The goal is to build a “patriotic reunification force” inside Taiwan without using violence.

This strategy is led by top CCP leaders like Wang Huning, who now oversees the entire United Front system. Under his guidance, Beijing is focusing less on propaganda and more on creating friendly, familiar experiences—like internships in China, startup grants for young entrepreneurs, and collaborations with Taiwanese influencers (Global Taiwan Institute, 2024). These programs look harmless or even helpful, but they’re designed to slowly build emotional ties to China (China Neican, 2025).

The message behind these efforts was made clear by Xi Jinping in 2019, when he rejected Taiwan’s interpretation of the 1992 Consensus and said that Taiwan must fully accept Beijing’s version of “One China” (Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan), 2019). Rather than force unification through war or threats, Beijing now wants it to feel natural—like it’s just the way things are supposed to be.

Influencer Diplomacy: How China Uses Social Media to Target Taiwan’s Youth

China is using short-form video platforms to quietly spread pro-Beijing messages among Taiwanese youth, turning social media into a key battleground for political influence. This strategy is part of the CCP’s broader United Front Work and is tied to the PLA’s “Three Warfares” doctrine, which focuses on shaping public opinion through non-military means (Observer Research Foundation, 2024). Taiwanese influencers are invited to China to create reels and livestreams that show an attractive image of Chinese life while avoiding direct political talk. These videos are designed to feel familiar and friendly, especially to younger viewers who spend much of their time on platforms like YouTube Shorts, Instagram, and TikTok (Global Taiwan Institute, 2025).

Programs such as the “Training Thousands of Taiwan Youth Anchors” give participants professional video tools, CCP-approved messaging support, and incentives to produce content that favors Beijing. These initiatives, run by CCP local offices, include contests, media workshops, and boot camps (Taipei Times, 2024). Participants are often screened for political leanings and placed in curated settings that subtly push CCP talking points.

Influencers receive ready-made scripts and hashtag plans that promote themes like cross-Strait closeness or criticism of Taiwan’s current government. Some are even guided to film in politically sensitive regions such as Xinjiang and present them in a positive light—part of a coordinated effort to counter negative global attention (Taiwan News, 2024).

By using familiar content formats and trusted local voices, China’s strategy hides political messaging behind entertainment. These videos are not just “lifestyle” posts—they are vehicles for political narratives, crafted to influence public opinion at scale.

How China Targets Young Taiwanese Minds by Educational Exchange: Socialization Infrastructure

China is using cross-strait university exchange programs to shape the political views of young Taiwanese at a key stage in their lives when they have just gained the right to vote and are still forming their political identities. These programs are promoted as academic or cultural exchanges, but they are carefully designed to guide participants toward views that support the Chinese Communist Party (Huang, 2023).

Students who join these programs are often chosen based on their openness to pro-China ideas. Once in China, they are placed in highly controlled environments, often on campuses linked to United Front groups, where they are shown a positive and peaceful version of China while being exposed to soft nationalist messaging (Taiwan News, 2024). When they return to Taiwan, many students share these favorable impressions with their classmates, spreading the influence further through social circles (The Daily Guardian, 2024).

Some of these efforts are supported by elite groups, especially the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation, which organizes visits between Taiwan’s KMT-linked students and party-controlled institutions in China. These trips aim to build long-term networks that connect Taiwan’s conservative youth with Beijing’s ideological system (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2024).

More than 60,000 Taiwanese students have already taken part in these programs, with thousands studying full-time at universities that follow the CCP’s political line. This is not just soft diplomacy—it is a large, organized effort to influence the next generation of Taiwanese voters through emotional connection, repetition, and peer influence.

Grassroots Delegations: How China Recruits Local Leaders in Taiwan

China is targeting Taiwan’s older population by working through local community figures, especially Village/Neighborhood representatives and temple leaders, who are trusted by seniors and have deep roots in neighborhoods. These people serve as key channels for spreading pro-China messages in everyday settings, often under the cover of cultural activities.

One main tactic is offering free or subsidized trips to China. In 2023, several Village/Neighborhood representatives in New Taipei City were charged for joining “exchange visits” that included subtle messaging about unification with China (Taipei Times, 2023). Because these Village/Neighborhood representatives are seen as familiar and reliable, their participation helps make Beijing’s messaging seem less political and more acceptable in older communities.

Temple representatives are another way China spreads influence. Many Mazu religious events connect to Fujian and Chinese traditions, which appeal to seniors who still feel cultural ties to pre-1949 China. These trips mix religion and politics, building emotional support for Beijing’s view of cross-strait “oneness” (Asia News Network, 2023). Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has warned that such exchanges are sometimes used to influence elections or gather intelligence (BBC News, 2023).

All of these efforts target older generations who may still carry shared memories or family connections to China. Instead of using hard propaganda, Beijing relies on emotion, tradition, and trusted community figures to quietly shape political views from the ground up.

Domesticized Influence: Immigrant Wives as Cognitive Warfare

One of China’s quietest but most personal influence tactics in Taiwan involves Chinese women who marry Taiwanese men and settle on the island. After gaining residency or citizenship, some of these women become informal messengers for pro-China views, both online and in daily family life. Unlike media propaganda or political speeches, this messaging feels personal, emotional, and hard to detect.

This strategy is based on the PLA’s view that shaping people’s minds is just as important as winning on the battlefield (PLA AMS, 2020). Instead of using force or pressure, the goal is to slowly change how people think, especially older family members—through friendly conversations, family group chats, or shared opinions at temples and local events.

Some of these women also post on platforms like YouTube, TikTok, or Facebook, using daily content—such as cooking, parenting, or stories about marriage—to slide in soft messages that make China look strong and Taiwan weak. These posts often avoid direct political talk but still suggest that Taiwan belongs with China or that unification is “natural.”

This issue became widely known in 2025 when three Chinese wives in Taiwan were deported for spreading pro-China military content and saying Taiwan was “falling apart” (BBC News, 2025a; Asia News, 2025). Their livestreams praised the PLA and claimed marriage was a way to return to the “motherland” (Taipei Times, 2024a).

As of 2023, Taiwan had more than 350,000 cross-strait marriages, and new ones are growing fast—up 185% in a single year (MAC, 2023). Many of these wives live in towns where older Taiwanese rely on close family circles and LINE group chats, which are also common targets for political disinformation (BBC News, 2025).

Taiwan’s Multi-Actor Defense Strategy Against Chinese Disinformation: Government’s Whole-of-Society Strategy

China’s disinformation campaign against Taiwan targets people in different ways, through social media influencers, older community leaders, Chinese spouses, student exchanges, and fringe online content. To protect its democracy, Taiwan needs a defense strategy that goes beyond classrooms or tech tools. It must be fully reaching into every corner of society, from schools and temples to local governments and global alliances.

First, Taiwan’s media literacy efforts must expand beyond schools. Although the Ministry of Education has added this topic to K–12 education (K12 Education Administration, 2021), older people, especially in rural areas, often don’t get the same support (Ministry of Education, 2009). Community centers, temples, and local radio stations can help reach these groups with targeted outreach (Taipei Times, 2024).

Second, civic tech and fact-checking groups like Cofacts and the Taiwan FactCheck Center are doing essential work, but they don’t have stable funding or long-term support (Rights CoLab, 2025). Taiwan’s government should formally partner with them through guaranteed grants, public contracts, or official collaboration models like those used by Meedan (2025) without taking over their independence. This fits with the Ministry of Digital Affairs’ “Three Arrows” strategy, which now needs national scale (Ministry of Digital Affairs, 2025).

Third, Taiwan’s laws must evolve to keep up with new influence tactics. The Anti-Infiltration Act helps stop money and people tied to Chinese political interference (Taiwan News, 2025). But it doesn’t cover things like algorithm manipulation or soft-power content hidden in entertainment or social media (Taipei Times, 2023). The law must be able to update quickly as tactics change, with better coordination across ministries.

Fourth, local governments need more tools to detect threats in their communities. Recent cases like Village/Neighborhood representatives accepting trips to China or influencers promoting PLA talking points show how easy it is for small-scale actors to be co-opted (RTI Radio Taiwan International, 2025). Cities and towns should get practical templates, training, and alert systems so they can respond faster.

Fifth, Taiwan’s international leadership is key. Programs like the Global Cooperation and Training Framework help Taiwan share its democratic defense model, but they can also become platforms for new tech and policy solutions with other democracies (Lowy Institute, 2024). Groups like the National Endowment for Democracy (2024) and The Diplomat (2024) show that Taiwan’s grassroots approach could help other countries—if it’s properly funded, improved, and supported by stronger alliances.

Together, these five areas form the backbone of Taiwan’s multi-actor strategy against China’s growing disinformation threat. This is not just about stopping fake news. It’s about defending how people think, feel, and connect to democracy—online, offline, and everywhere in between.

Defending Democracy Starts With Daily Life

China’s influence operations in Taiwan reveal a long-term strategy that blends emotional messaging, grassroots penetration, and digital manipulation to undermine trust in democratic institutions. The goal is not only to shift opinions about China but also to weaken Taiwan’s social unity and civic confidence from within. Unlike traditional propaganda, it uses everyday conversations and personal relationships to quietly spread pro-Beijing narratives. It turns Taiwan’s openness—its freedoms of speech, movement, and belief—into tools for foreign interference.

Democratic resilience must meet this challenge with the same depth and adaptability. Stronger legal protections, smarter digital infrastructure, civic education, and trusted local networks are all essential—but they must work together. Taiwan cannot rely on any single tool or actor. The defense must be multi-layered, proactive, and embedded in daily life. The future of Taiwan’s democracy will be shaped not only by how it resists external pressure but by how it strengthens its internal cohesion. China’s strategy is clear—and so must be Taiwan’s response.

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Yenting Lin is a Master’s student in Public Policy at George Mason University. He holds a B.A. and B.S. from National Chung Cheng University in Taiwan. His research focuses on algorithmic hate speech, AI-driven misinformation, and their impact on national security and U.S.–Taiwan–China relations. His work has been featured in Small Wars Journal, American Intelligence Journal, and The Defence Horizon Journal. The views in this article are his own.